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Abstract
Financial constraints to farmers in Africa have been a long-standing problem, 
but most of the literature on this topic in Namibia and elsewhere has been 
descriptive. The aim of this paper is to explain the causes of financing constraints. 
It does so by focusing on agricultural Small and Medium-scale Enterprises 
(SMEs) in Namibia. The research employs a qualitative research methodology 
made up of the purposive-judgement sampling and the Noticing, Collecting and 
Thinking approach in analysing the data. The study shows that there is a lack of 
collateral and poor loan recovery on the supply-side while on the demand-side, 
the provision of insufficient capital and bureaucracy are the biggest constraints 
preventing a number of agricultural SMEs from accessing finance from formal 
financial institutions. These findings have major implications for the role of the 
state in financing agriculture in Africa.  
Keywords: Agriculture financing; Namibia; Small and Medium Enterprises
   
1. Introduction
Sir Paul Collier, the British mainstream economist, has consistently denounced 
small-scale agriculture in Africa. Recently, he and his colleague (Stefan Dercon) 
claimed that “trying to fix market imperfection problems in the credit market is 
the best solution not promoting smallholder agriculture” (Collier & Dercon, 
2014:93). The experience of Namibia, however, shows that Collier’s analysis is 
oversimplified. The country is pursuing a smallholder-driven approach (MAWF, 
2008) with constraints and opportunities that defy Collier’s dualism. One of 
the desired outcomes of the NDP4 is for agriculture to experience average real 
growth of 4% per annum over the NDP4 period 2012–2017. As a major strategy 
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towards the realisation of this goal, continued financial and technical support 
is expected to be offered to those involved in agricultural production activities 
(NPC, 2013). This strategy warrants careful study, particularly because while 
smallholder activities abound in Africa (Elhadary, Samat & Obeng-Odoom, 
2013), the state in Africa – much like described by Collier – has tended to be 
quite antagonistic to farming on a small scale, preferring instead to promote 
commercial and large-scale agriculture (Obeng-Odoom, 2015). 
Our knowledge of small-scale agriculture, particularly its financial aspects, 
remains inadequate even though financial services in Africa continue to expand 
(Abor, Alagidede, Ocran & Adjasi, 2014; Both, 2015). Research on financial 
development in Africa has also grown in recent times (see e.g. Domeher, Frim-
pong & Appiah, 2014; Gwama, 2014; Mazanai & Fatoki, 2012; Ndikumana, 
2001), but it does not centre on agriculture, a focus that can help to advance 
the global debate on financing development (see Both, 2015) and development 
finance more generally. 
The paper addresses this gap by relating the research on finance to the finan-
cial constraints faced by SMEs in agriculture. Theoretically, the paper focuses 
on the so-called logic of market failure and, as a result, the need for government 
intervention. Eyiah and Cook (2003) cite imperfections in financial markets 
as one of the specific constraints to financial access for SMEs. Beck, Demir-
guç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) identified these imperfections as collateral 
requirements, bank paperwork and bureaucracy, high interest rates in compa-
rison with the profitability of agricultural activities, the need to have special 
connections with banks, lack of money in the banking system and lack of access 
to financing for leasing equipment. However, Beck and Demirguç-Kunt (2006) 
found evidence that it was not only market imperfections that impeded SMEs’ 
access to financial services but also their institutional weaknesses. Put simply, 
real-life markets contain varying and systemic degrees of imperfections from 
both the demand and the supply side (see Minot, 1986). 
The formal contribution of this paper lies in the new data collected and the me-
thodology adopted. Most of the literature on this topic in Namibia and elsewhere 
has used secondary information that was either from census data (e.g. Adongo & 
Deen-Swarray, 2006; High Level Panel of Experts, 2013; World Bank, 2013) or 
panel data and/or regression analysis (e.g. Guirkinger & Boucher, 2008; Obeng, 
2008; Reyes, Lensink, Kuyvenhoven & Moll, 2012). Although these studies 
have provided a ‘big picture’ of financial access for small businesses, they have 
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not paid sufficient attention to the complexities that both farmers and financial 
organisations face every day that might have an impact on poverty in local com-
munities. This paper, in contrast, goes further to describe and explain the pheno-
menon surrounding constraints to financing agriculture from the ‘ground’ using 
a naturalistic approach with narratives that highlight and illustrate key issues. 
This alternative approach reveals that a lack of collateral and poor loan recovery 
on the supply side and insufficient capital, bureaucracy and lack of collateral on 
the demand side are the biggest constraints to financing agricultural SMEs from 
formal financial institutions.
Following this introduction, the rest of the paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 provides a conceptualisation of financial constraints and Agricultural 
SME finance followed by a review of literature of finance constraints outlined 
in Section 3. The methodology used is explained in section 4. The results are 
presented in section 5, while section 6 makes up the discussion and summary.  
2. Conceptualizing financial constraints and agricultural SME finance
The definition of a ‘financing constraint’ or ‘credit constraint’ comes from the 
work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, as cited in Reyes et al., 2012). According to 
the definition used, certain individuals obtain loans while other individuals, who 
are willing to borrow at precisely the same terms, do not. Because lenders may 
take on risky project applications only at high interest rates, they refuse to raise 
the interest rate to eliminate excess demand and, consequently, may ration their 
supply of credit. This type of credit is referred to as quantity rationing and is 
therefore a supply-side credit constraint. On the demand side, risk rationing and 
transaction cost rationing are other forms of credit constraints identified. Risk 
rationing constraint refers to a situation where farmers may not seek a formal 
loan because the risk implied by the available credit contract is too high where-
as transaction cost rationing constraint refers to a situation where farmers may 
not seek a loan simply because of high transaction costs. Growing empirical 
literature suggests that in rural areas of developing countries, credit constraints 
have significant adverse effects on farm output (Huppi & Feder, 1990), farm 
profit (Carter, 1988; Foltz, 2004) and farm investment (Carter & Olinto, 2003) 
whether for large-, medium- or small-scale enterprises. 
The conceptualization of SMEs is similarly varied. Burns (2001) has argued 
that in order for a business to qualify as an SME, it should be subdivided 
into three parts, both the employee and the independence criteria have to be 
satisfied plus either the turnover or the criteria for the balance sheet should 
be met. However, Senderovitz (2009 as cited in Amiss 2012) is of the opinion 
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that there is no “one best approach” to defining SMEs and therefore the SME 
definition should be the result of a deliberate and well-grounded choice taking 
the methodology, purpose and/or content of the study into account. International 
Finance Corporation (2011:15) has therefore suggested that agribusiness SMEs 
can be thought of as those agricultural businesses that fit the general definition 
of an SME for a given country or region. 
In Namibia, the acronym SME(s) refers to Small and Micro Enterprise(s) as 
opposed to Small and Medium Enterprise(s). There is no formal definition in the 
country that includes Medium enterprises. The following definition in Table 1 
has been given to define SMEs in Namibia. 






Manufacturing Less than 10 USD81169 USD 40 584 
Other businesses* Less than 5 USD 20292 USD  8117
Source: (Tonin et al. 1998)
*=Agricultural Small Enterprises fall into the category of other businesses
Agribank refers to enterprises that are small, medium and involved in agricul-
tural production as small- and medium-scale farmers as opposed to small- and 
medium-scale enterprises. Small-scale farmers are those who are farming on 
3–6 hectares, and medium-scale farmers are those who are farming on 12 hect-
ares. However, Kirsten and Van Zyl (1998) are of the opinion that the size of 
the land alone is not a good criterion to define small-scale farms. They argue 
that “Defining the ‘viable farm’ in terms of size alone had a profoundly negative 
effect on the relative profitability of farms smaller than the viable size” (Kirsten 
& Van Zyl, 1998:562).
This paper therefore combines the definitions of Agribank and Kirsten and 
Van Zyl (1998) to define a small-scale farmer as one who is farming on 3–6 
hectares and has maximum annual turnover of less than US$20 292. A medium-
scale farmer is one who is farming on 6-12 hectares and has maximum annual 
turnover not exceeding US$39 919. This paper argues that SMEs in the Namibian 
context shall be defined to include medium-scale enterprises as well. It would be 
ideal to review the existing definition to allow for comparisons.
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2.1. Agricultural SME finance
SME finance typically refers to financial services that exist specifically for 
Small and Medium-sized enterprises (Beck, 2013). 
Agricultural finance is defined as a ‘sectoral concept that comprises financial 
services for agricultural production, processing, and marketing. This includes 
short-, medium-, and long-term loans, leasing, savings, payment services, crop 
and livestock insurance’ (International Finance Corporation, 2011:13). 
Combining SME finance and agricultural finance, Agricultural SME finance 
is therefore defined as financial services for small and medium enterprises en-
gaged in agricultural production (i.e., farming) and production-related activi-
ties, such as input supply, processing, trade, wholesaling, and marketing (Inter-
national Finance Corporation, 2011:13). Although the definition of Agricultural 
SME finance found includes the whole value chain, this paper only refers to Ag-
ricultural SME finance as financial services for small and medium enterprises 
engaged in agricultural production (i.e. farming) and not the whole value chain. 
According to the International Finance Corporation (2011:17) there are four 
types of farmers engaged in primary agricultural production that would be con-
sidered agricultural SMEs. These are semi- commercial smallholders also re-
ferred to as subsistence farmers, commercial smallholders whose surplus crop 
production may be sold for cash, medium-sized farmers also referred to as 
emerging farmers who produce meaningful income from farming and part of the 
land may be used for commercial farming and lastly large farmers who produce 
and make their output in a professional manner and have access to a full range 
of financial services.
Because semi-commercial smallholders do not produce to make a profit and do 
not have access to financial institutions although financial inclusion is important, 
this study has concentrated specifically on the commercial smallholders,and 
medium-sized type of farmers in crop production in communal areas.
  
3. Empirical literature review: Identified financing constraints
The literature on financing constraints in agricultural SMEs has developed 
around six themes namely (1) collateral and land issues, (2) bank paperwork and 
bureaucracy, (3) risky – seasonality with long gestation periods, (4) poor access 
to markets and low profits, (5) lack of skills in agriculture and (6)  information 
asymmetry. Each of these is reviewed in turn. 
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(1) Collateral and land issues
Land is no doubt an important asset to have in agriculture as it not only helps 
to increase farmers’ confidence in what they are doing but may also improve 
access to financial services. Trzeciak-Duval (2003) avers that well-established 
property rights, particularly regarding the use of land, are of particular 
importance in the agricultural sector because they lead to the possibility of using 
land as collateral and credit constraints can be eased. Similarly, Foltz (2004) 
used survey data of randomly selected households engaged in irrigated farming 
in the Cap Bon region of north-eastern Tunisia to measure the credit rationing of 
households. He emphasises that having title to land is expected to have a greater 
influence on supply than demand because it increases collateral and creates a 
direct relationship to supply while land titles bring about an increase in demand 
through an investment demand equation, which in the end benefits lenders. This 
result is in line with the findings of Reyes et al. (2012:12) who used a panel 
data set from a survey conducted in 2006 and 2008 with 177 farmers and found 
that “possession of land reduces the probability of being credit constrained. 
Titled land may be used as collateral which helps formal financial institutions 
overcome adverse selection and moral hazard problem”.
While studies by Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) and Cabannes (2012) in addition 
to those reviewed above have stressed the importance of land tenure in order to 
have better access to financial services on both the demand and the supply side, 
Gilbert (2002) has a different opinion based on his data gathered in the self-help 
settlement of Bogota, Colombia. His results show that having title to land does 
not necessarily lead to formal access to credit. In other words, land ownership 
makes little or no difference to the availability of formal sources of credit. Because 
of transfer uncertainty, the bank may not accept land as collateral because it may 
not be able to repossess it in case of default. Even when borrowers have title to 
land, they may not be willing to borrow because of fear that they may not be able 
to repay the loan. Similarly, a critical review of the relevant literature on land 
registration, access to credit and agricultural investment by Domeher and Abdulai 
(2012) agrees with Gilbert (2002) in explaining that owning land has failed to 
enhance agricultural investment because the demand side does not provide an 
incentive for investment for reasons such as widespread poverty in Africa, a 
lack of appropriate agriculture-based infrastructure and the highly risky nature 
of agriculture in Africa. The supply side, namely lenders, in contrast, does not 
look at land registration in isolation but also looks at where that particular land 
is located and whether it can be used as collateral. In addition, lenders’ views are 
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that land registration does not change the profitability of agricultural activities 
or improve the repayment capacity of farmers. Domeher and Abdulai (2012) 
therefore conclude that the pursuit of land registration alone as an agricultural 
investment tool may fail unless critical factors are given priority. These include 
interventions by government to tackle the problems that have made African 
agriculture highly risky, unprofitable and unattractive. 
Plainly, land is just part of the equation in gaining financial access, at least 
when it comes to agriculture, and not the solution. Beck (2013) surveyed the 
recent literature on the relationship between SMEs, financial deepening and 
economic development and concluded that loan classifications that relied 
completely on collateral were biased against SMEs that had less hard collateral 
available. Perhaps other types of lending requirements, such as relationship 
lending, should be considered. 
(2) Bank paperwork and bureaucracy
Beck, Demirguç-Kunt, Laeven and Maksimovic (2006), whose data were taken 
from the World Business Environment Survey conducted in 1999 and 2000 in 80 
developing countries, argue that agricultural and construction firms face greater 
obstacles compared to service firms, especially when it comes to bank paperwork, 
bureaucracy and high interest rates. For SMEs, processing loan applications 
usually takes longer due to the number of forms that they must complete, 
which makes it more difficult for them to even think about gaining access to 
finance from a formal financial institution. Bureaucracy, or red tape as it is often 
referred to, generally involves completing seemingly unnecessary paperwork, 
obtaining unnecessary licences, having multiple people or committees approve 
a decision and having to abide by various low-level rules that make conducting 
one’s affairs slower, more difficult or both (Martini, 2013). Rehber (1998) note 
that farmers who are involved in contract farming run the risk of nonrenewal or 
termination of contracts for noneconomic reasons and losing timely receipt of 
desired quality and quantity of their products.
In order to reduce the bureaucratic process, some countries have adopted 
measures developed by the OECD in 2006 to reduce the regulatory burden 
on SMEs. Process reengineering is one. Within these measures, timeframe 
is established and ‘silence is consent’. This means that institutions have a 
timeframe in which to respond to financial requests, and failure to do so implies 
that all the necessary conditions have been met (Martini, 2013).  
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(3) Risky – seasonality with long gestation periods
By isolating promising cases of emergent and innovative financing, risk 
mitigation and distribution models, the IFC identified key elements observed 
across various case studies in developing countries and found that challenges in 
lending to agriculture existed because of the risk associated with seasonality, with 
long gestation periods from planting to harvest. The result is that cash flows are 
highly seasonal and sometimes irregular, with earnings concentrated in certain 
times of the year. Because of this, there is slow income from agricultural SMEs 
as compared to SMEs in other sectors. For a financial institution, this means 
that short-term agricultural credit may need to be repaid in ‘lumpy instalments’, 
sometimes over multiple seasons. It also means that farmers require flexible 
and targeted savings and term finance products to meet their specific needs. 
From the banker’s point of view, irregular repayment schedules make liquidity 
management more challenging and require costly investments in developing 
customised loan products in an unfamiliar sector (IFC, 2012). 
(4) Poor access to markets and low profits
The main constraint faced by farmers is poor access to markets. In order to meet 
the demands of the consumers, food retailers usually need products that are 
packaged by their suppliers and are of high quality. Consumers usually look for 
these types of products from food retailers rather than straight from smallholders 
because the products from smallholders are perceived to be unclean and not 
of high quality. Based on a comparative analysis of international development 
activities in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Near East, Minot (1986) claims 
that smallholders usually lack the capital to maintain the set standard and to meet 
this type of demand and that the lack of credible assurance of quality reduces 
the demand for a product to the point that the market disappears. Fibiger, Weber 
and Schnabel (2011) note that as a result of this, smallholders struggle to settle 
their debts because their profits are quite small due to marketing difficulties 
and harvest losses, and when the state steps in for those who are unable to pay 
back their loans, there are cases of abuse where loans are used for things other 
than the declared purposes. In Namibia, even if farmers produce, harvest and 
deliver their produce to relevant marketing agencies in the country, they still 
stand a chance of nonpayment for their produce, thus experiencing low profits. 
“After you harvest, they take your produce and go. Officials threaten farmers 
with eviction from the State-owned vineyards if they complain about the non-
payment” (Haidula, 2015:1).
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(5) Lack of skills in agriculture
On the one hand, using mainly secondary sources of information in examining 
the status of agricultural and rural finance in South Africa, De Klerk, Fraser 
and Fullerton (2013) argue that many financial institutions do not understand 
adequately how specialised the agricultural sector is and how difficult it is to 
succeed and/or transform from an emerging into a commercial farmer. On the 
other hand, the Agricultural Sector Skills Plan reports that farmers do not have the 
requisite skills to perform their work to an expected standard (Namibia Training 
Authority, 2013). However, Norton, Alwang and Masters (2015) posit that often 
the training provided in agriculture, especially in developing countries, does not 
correspond to the real conditions faced by farmers and that usually time spent 
in such training reduces time available for other relevant activities. The Ghana 
banking survey that used interviews with a number of stakeholders to sample 
their views on SMEs concluded that banks should invest in acquiring a good 
understanding of working with SMEs, irrespective of the industries or economic 
sectors that they operate in or the scale of their operations. This is crucial for 
banks-SMEs relationships and therefore important for the financial inclusion 
question (Pricewaterhouse Coopers Ghana, 2013).
(6) Information asymmetry
Imperfect information is usually the main reason for higher transaction costs, 
especially in rural areas where farmers are located. The opinion of Bartlett and 
Bukvič (2001) whose research was based on a sample survey of small firms in 
Slovenia and on an econometric analysis of the sources of firms’ growth is that 
Information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers make it hard for banks 
to determine the real value of a project, and lead to credit rationing Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981 as cited by Bartlett & Bukvič 2001). The high risk of credit 
to SMEs with information asymmetry may explain the relatively high interest 
rates charged to those borrowers, and the demands made on SMEs by banks for 
high collateral and loan guarantees (Bartlett & Bukvič, 2001:182)
Aleem (1990) used 14 informal money market lenders and their clients in 
Chambar, Pakistan, to examine whether high implicit interest rates charged re-
flected the actual costs of operating in that particular market. He found that due 
to imperfections, the lender was not motivated to reduce interest rates in order to 
increase the number of borrowers, even when rates were well above the lender’s 
marginal cost of lending. Imperfect information available to farmers about the 
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terms on which loan contracts are being sold in the market implies that a lowe-
ring of interest rates is a signal that filters through to only a limited section of 
the market. This is a situation that occurs mostly with informal moneylenders; 
however, these types of lenders were beyond the scope of this study. 
Trzeciak-Duval (2003) is of the opinion that sources of information are 
important to creditors to establish credit histories and to borrowers to obtain 
market information and to produce data. Because of a lack of information, a moral 
hazard problem usually arises. The latter normally occurs because individuals’ 
actions cannot be observed and hence contracted on (see Holmstrom, 1979).
4. Methodology
The research methodology for this study derived from the objectives. In using a 
qualitative methodology, a case study research design by way of in-depth semi-
structured interviews and document analysis was followed. According to Creswell 
(2013), qualitative research is an approach for exploring and understanding the 
meaning that individuals or groups assign to a social or human problem. The 
qualitative methodology was considered to be appropriate for this study because 
the researcher’s aim was to interact with people in their natural settings, using a 
language that they understood and then finding out what meanings they attached 
to financial access for agriculture. Talking to participants in their natural settings 
was helpful in exploring and gaining insight into the topic under investigation. 
A semi-structured interview is a verbal interchange between two people where 
one person, the interviewer, attempts to elicit information. Although the 
interviewer prepares a number of questions well in advance, semi-structured 
interviews unfold in a conversational manner offering participants the chance 
to explore issues they feel are important (Longhurst, 2009). Semi-structured 
interviews allow the researcher to follow his or her own thoughts and probing 
techniques are allowed (Cooper and Schindler, 2011). A structured interview as 
opposed to an unstructured interview eases the researcher’s task of organizing 
and analysing interview data. It also helps readers of the reports to judge the 
quality of the interviewing method and instruments  (Bowen 2005:217). Given 
that the degree to which questions were structured depended on the whether one 
received finance from Agribank or not and whether they were small or medium-
size. It is the participant’s history and experience that decided which topics were 
important in the various interviews.  
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4.1 Sample and site selection
Purposive sampling is a nonprobability method of sampling whereby respon-
dents are chosen according to the researcher’s judgement as to their suitability 
for the projects. It is also referred to as judgement sampling (Sarantakos, 2005). 
The following criteria were included:
•  Participants had to be involved in primary production with a farm size 
between 3 and 12 hectares.  
•  Participants had to produce to sell and not for family consumption..
Table 2 below provides the population list of the Green Scheme projects that 
fitted the criteria above that the researcher was presented with by the Agricultu-
ral Business Development Agency (AGRIBUSDEV) office in Windhoek, Na-
mibia (To have a clear idea of the location of the Green Scheme projects in the 
country, see the map in Figure 1).
TablE 2: populaTion liST of ThE GrEEn-SchEmES
Green-scheme Number of farmers 
(with valid contracts) 
in a green-scheme 
Region
1. Etunda green-scheme irrigation project 9 Omusati region
2. Uvhunguhungu green-scheme irrigation project 10 Kavango region
3. Hardap green-scheme irrigation project 13 Hardap region
4. Ndonga-linena green-scheme irrigation project 28 Kavango region
5. Shadikongoro irrigation project 13 Kavango region
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fiGurE 1: map of namibia wiTh rEGionS
Source: Stat planet1
To ensure that there was equal representation of the Green-Scheme projects 
from the list provided in terms of the location of regions in the country, the 
following Green-Scheme projects (with corresponding sample sizes) were jud-
gementally selected per region:
1. Etunda green-scheme irrigation project - 5 
2. Hardap green-scheme irrigation project - 6  
3. Ndonga- linena green-scheme irrigation project -5  
Table 1 in the results sections that shows the characteristics of all the par-
ticipants (on the demand side) and the number of farmers analysed per region. 
On the supply side, two interviews were conducted at the Agribank Head 
Office in the Khomas Region and Oshakati Branch in the Oshana Region to 
determine the constraints that Agribank experienced in financing agricultural 
SMEs. 
1  Stat planet is software for interactive data visualisation and mapping.  
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a) Research measures and sample size
After ethics approval by the University of Stellenbosch Business School ethics 
committee and permission by Agribank had been granted, a total of 16 inter-
views were conducted for this paper (11 small-scale farmers and 5 medium-scale 
farmers were interviewed). Included in the 16 interviews were 3 independent2 
farmers in the same regions who were operating outside3 the Green Scheme 
projects. These were Second Chance Garden in the Omusati Region and Pozere 
and Gamade gardens in the Kavango East Region. 
The adequacy of only two interviews on the supply side is certain in the sense 
that besides Agribank having branches (six in total) in other regions, many of 
the decisions of these other branches go through Head Office (Khomas Region) 
before they are implemented. In addition, Oshakati Branch in the Oshana 
Region deals with farmers of various scales in four northern regions, which is 
the highest number of regions dealt with compared to the other four Agribank 
branches (in the Hardap, Kavango East, Caprivi and Otjozondjupa regions) 
that deal only with a maximum of one or two regions. Because of this, the 
researcher was sure to obtain more detailed information from the Khomas and 
Oshana regions than the other regions. On the demand side, the accessibility of 
the farmers, more especially farmers without Agribank loans, the willingness of 
participants to speak freely with the interviewer and data saturation determined 
the number of interviews conducted. 
b) Research procedures 
Participants were given informed consent forms to read. They were given the 
opportunity to ask any questions related to the study and had to sign the forms 
before the researcher could commence with the interview. All questions were 
translated into Oshiwambo (the language of the Omusati Region). For partici-
pants who could not understand the official language, English (For example in 
Kavango East region, many of the participants could only speak in rukwanga-
ri.), a person was used to help with translation in the Kavango East region as the 
researcher could not understand the language. The collected data were reported 
in such a way that persons could not be identified. The interviews lasted no more 
than 45 minutes each. The interviews were conducted between September and 
December 2014 at the interviewees’ places of work, which were located mostly 
at the Green Scheme projects on the demand side and bank offices on the supply 
side. The interviews were taped and transcribed for analysis, and anonymity of 
the participants was ensured. 
2 Independent in this paper means not receiving financial assistance from Agribank and/or operating 
outside the green-scheme projects
3 Identified by way of snowball sampling
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c) Data analysis process
If qualitative research is to yield meaningful and useful results, it is imperative 
that the material under scrutiny be analysed in a methodical manner (Attride-
Stirling, 2001; Pope, Ziebland & Mays, 2014). Content and thematic analyses 
were the main techniques for data analysis. To support the analysis, the software 
ATLAS.ti was used. For a computer-assisted analysis, Friese (2014) suggests 
the use of the NCT approach – Noticing things, Collecting things and Thinking 
about things. (see Figure 2 below).
fiGurE 2: ThE NCT modEl 
Source: Friese, 2014:15
Noticing things according to Friese (2014) refers to the process of finding 
interesting things in the data when reading through transcripts, field notes, 
documents, reports and so forth. After data collection, interviews were 
transcribed, read through, cleaned up and uploaded into the ATLAS.ti software. 
It was during this process that noticing things in the data started. After the 
researcher had noticed the right information in the data pertinent to the research 
questions, collecting things began. 
Collecting things refers to the process of naming things that one has noticed 
and grouping those things that belong together or have the same name. This is 
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referred to as coding. Codes relevant to the research questions were created, and 
themes were established. Data were then systematically examined to see ways 
in which themes were portrayed. This study employed an open coding with both 
an inductive and a deductive framework approach. Coding is defined by Cooper 
and Schindler (2011) as categorising and combing the data for themes, ideas and 
categories and then marking similar passages of text with a code label. 
Thinking about things refers to the ability to think about things that one has 
noticed and collected in order to find patterns and relations in the data. The cate-
gories were refined through a repetitive glance at the data. During this process, 
subcategories or new categories of themes were identified and analysis conti-
nued until no new categories emerged. The research question memoranda were 
then set up and linked to the various types of constraints identified in the data. 
Using the NCT method of analysis enables an analyst to work in a systematic 
manner (Friese, 2014). The main aim is to put all the findings together and gain 
a coherent understanding of the phenomenon.
In the findings section, illustrative comments are presented in the form of 
quotes for the various themes in order to provide a sense of what participants 
actually experienced. 
d) Limitation
Namibia is a country with a highly dispersed population, the research only 
covered a small number of farmers, especially those without Agribank loans, 
and this may have created some bias. The reason for this is that independent 
farmers are difficult to locate because they are not farming in one place as 
compared to Agribank loan holders who are mainly found in Green Scheme 
projects. Nevertheless, many of the participants were representative because 
one farmer with an Agribank loan in a particular Green Scheme project could 
also have represented the entire Green Scheme in a region because of repetitions 
in farmers’ interviews and therefore data saturation. The study mitigated the 
limitations by ensuring that both private and Green Scheme farmers were 
included in the study and ensuring regional representation. Furthermore, the 
research design employed allowed for the sample size used in this study. 
e) Criteria for judging the quality of the research
According to Yin (2009), there are criteria to consider in judging the quality 
of the research. These are construct validity, internal validity, external validity 
and reliability. For this study, quality was ensured by doing the following: For 
construct validity, multiple sources of evidence, namely interviews, secondary 
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data and document analysis, were used. The secondary data documents provi-
ded the necessary information to make cross-references for the inferences from 
primary data.
For external validity, the results from this study may only be generalised to 
relevant theory used in carrying out the study and not to the population. 
The reliability of the data for this study is solely attributable to the answers 
given by the interviewees. The procedures used in carrying out the study were 
documented to allow data collection and analysis by another researcher.
Internal validity is about establishing causal relationships. Because this study 
did not measure any relationships, internal validity is not applicable to the study. 
5. Results
5.1 Characteristics of the participants
Table 3 below shows that the majority of the participants were male and had 
the highest average number of 8 and 9 years in business for independent and 
out grower farmers respectively. Furthermore, many small-scale farmers have 
Agirbank loans as compared to medium-scale farmers.  
TablE 3: characTEriSTicS of parTicipanTS
Characteristics of farmers  
without Agribank loans
Characteristics of farmers with  
Agribank loans in green-schemes 
Hardap Kavango Omusati Hardap Kavango Omusati
Sex n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Male 3 (100) 2 (100) 0 (0) 1 (50) 3 (75) 2 (50)
Female 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (100) 1 (50) 1 (25) 2 (50)
Size of farm
Small 0 (0) 2 (100) 1 (100) 1 (50) 4 (100) 3 (75)
Medium 3 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 50 0 (0) 1 (25)
Average num-
ber of years in 
business
2 8 3 2 4.25 9.5
Average  
start-up cost
48300 2700 *- 170000 93600 63500
(Footnotes)
Source: authors’ data, fieldwork, 2014
Note: percentages may not add up 100% due to rounding. Amounts are displayed in US dollars.
*. The interviewee did not want to divulge the information 
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5.2. Financial constraints - Demand side
Demand-side constraints refer to difficulties experienced by borrowers, namely 
small- and medium-scale farmers, in accessing finance from financial institutions. 
Financing constraints were identified from two groups of farmers. One group 
included farmers who were receiving financial assistance from Agribank, and 
the other group was comprised of farmers without Agribank loans. Figure 3 
below shows the constraints for farmers with Agribank loans, and Figure 4 
shows the constraints for farmers without Agribank loans.  
fiGurE 3: financinG conSTrainTS for farmErS wiTh aGribank loanS 
fiGurE 4: financinG conSTrainTS for farmErS wiThouT aGribank loanS 
Source: authors’ data, fieldwork, 2014
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In combining the two groups of farmers, the top five issues identified were a 
lack of collateral and land issues, bank rules and regulations, insufficient capital, 
poor understanding among loan officers, and bank paperwork and bureaucracy. 
Only illustrative quotes by participants pertaining to the top five constraints 
are presented. However, quotes for the rest of the constraints are available on 
request.  
5.3. Lack of collateral and land issues
Possessing collateral is regarded as one of the main requirements by banks that 
must be met. It is in this context that the independent farmers complained of the 
following: 
In Namibia most of the instances, a bankable business plan will not always help you. You can 
say this is the projections of the space, it is a workable thing it will be successful but still they 
would expect collateral (P1, 93:934)(sic)
I don’t know who brought this requirements of even when people want to buy farms, you can 
buy a farm with Agribank you must at least have hundred and fifty cattle that was the require-
ment then I don’t know if they have changed it now and I mean in communal areas most of us 
with historical reasons come from communal areas, where are you going to keep running fifty 
heads of cattle in a communal area? It’s an impossibility you know so the requirement, the loan 
requirements are too stiff, they are impractical and they are not workable. (P4, 129:129)
For farmers with Agribank loans, the untitled land provided by the government 
to small-scale farmers leaves farmers with uncertainties not only about how 
long they will continue with their businesses but also about whether they can 
continue to grow and become medium-scale farmers. 
The land belongs to the government and not to us and because of this you can find me here 
today but tomorrow I might not be here. A government official can always come and say I am 
not producing and that I should go then they can replace me with someone else while they are 
just seating in government offices. (P12, 92:92) 
I was very much impressed to get a loan because it was not easy for me to get it but now after 
five years I am going to graduate to be a medium farmer and I have to have my own collateral 
and the money which they are even talking for me to get a loan they are asking lots of money. 
They are saying at least I must have four hundred thousand on the account and it is not easy to 
have four hundred thousand because now I am farming I am having family, I am resettling and 
the people which are working for me they are depending on me because they are also having 
4 The numbers at the end of the quotes represent the primary documents numbers and paragraph 
numbers. For example P1, 93:93 mean the quote is from primary document 1, starting and ending in 
paragraph 93. 
5.  The numbers at the end of the quotes represent the primary documents numbers and paragraph 
numbers. For example P1, 93:93 mean the quote is from primary document 1, starting and ending in 
paragraph 93. 
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families and whatever, now it is difficult for us farmers like us who are going to graduate to go 
for the medium farmer because their requirements which they are asking is too much which we 
cannot afford. (P9, 110:110)
5.4 Bank rules and regulations
The rules of the bank are found to be discouraging some of the farmers from 
asking for a loan for agricultural purposes because of the bank’s terms and 
conditions and the repayment terms.
Agribank put up a rule that no second bond is to be granted until the loan is paid back and 
information is not very clear why I could not get a second bond. That would discourage people 
to take risks.  Also more money is paid back at the end of the day than what was given to me in 
the first place and the system could not trace why I paid more money (P2, 92:94).
Production loans repayment term must be prolonged to 4-5 years because 2 years is difficult 
especially for first time farmers. During the first two years one is still thinking of alternative 
options for business (P2, 104:104). 
Regulations regarding the need for Agribank to have information about the 
borrower before any loan is granted cause frustration among borrowers because 
they feel that the process takes too long and that they do not have any financing 
options apart from Agribank. 
The problem that I experienced was, the long time it took for the bank and the training institu-
tion to approve my qualification because nothing happens before the two institutions come to an 
agreement. The government should inform the bank that we have trained this person and he has 
passed his training by showing the qualifications, on the other hand the bank says no we don’t 
know the person and we are afraid of losing our money. Agribank usually needs assurance from 
the training institution whether we will be able to repay their money as they do not know our 
capability of repaying the money. The training institution usually tells the bank we have been 
with the person for certain number of years, his performance is good, he has good knowledge in 
farming and we believe that he will be able to repay the bank. That’s where the problem is most 
of time. It takes long for the training institution and the bank to come to an agreement on our 
ability to pay back the money but money can only come from Agribank (P16, 101:101).
5.5 Poor understanding among loan officers
In addition to the above, the absence of loan officers in the field has led farmers 
to believe that the former do not understand the issues that farmers face. 
They don’t understand our situation as us farmers who are down here because for them they 
are just in the office. They don’t understand the situation which is on the ground in the farm. 
When you tell them this you know if you are in the office you don’t, you are not used even may-
be even from their childhood you are not farming that’s the problem which we are facing even 
in our ministry. Most of the workers they don’t know what is farming, what are the challenges 
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of farming so they are  just there in the office when you complain, they say you complain too 
much but it is us suffering (P7, 168:168).
Another participant noted the following:
There should be someone from Agribank who knows what agriculture is because being in 
agriculture is a tough business there is a lot of challenges and unexpected losses. If Agribank has 
extension officers closer to the farmers who can come and assess that this farmer made this huge 
loss, what special treatment or discount should we give him. An unexpected loss is our biggest 
problem when it comes to our ability to pay back the loan. For instance if you look there, I only 
have two rows of corns left the rest are destroyed because there is a lack of water but having 
water here is not up to me but up to the government but I am expected to pay back every cent 
everything though I have not produced enough. These type of things need to be looked at and 
agricultural officers should be brought closer to the people. After each and every month he or 
she can come and look at how we have worked and assess the situation rather than just sitting in 
the office waiting for us to pay back the money (P16, 109:109).
5.6 Insufficient capital
Apart from poor understanding among loan officers, farmers are of the opinion 
that the amount of capital provided from Agribank in the form of a loan is too 
small and unable to cover the cost of inputs and ensure timely production. 
The requirements are fine its just that the loan amount itself is not enough because for anyone 
to put up collateral at the bank they usually put up a collateral equal to the value of the amount 
of money they are requesting so when the government decided to put a collateral, we don’t get 
enough money because the value of the collateral is small (P11, 104:104).
Financial constraints will not end because as we speak we are supposed to plant but like I said 
the amount of money that we receive as a loan is small. We were given the loan four years ago 
when we started but if a bag of maize costed twenty dollars then it doesn’t cost the same amount 
now. Like this year we exceeded before we could not even reach the due date of the loan. We 
cannot even buy input because the loan is finished in just one season when it was meant for two 
seasons. When we tell the government to extend our collateral to Agribank so that Agribank can 
increase our loan, they don’t want (P11:160:160).
5.7 Bank paperwork and bureaucracy
The time that it takes for lenders to respond to borrowers is another issue that 
discourages farmers from asking for financial assistance. It leads to farmers 
giving up or delaying production. Participants noted the following: 
I did not get any response and whenever I went to ask there was no response so I just gave 
up (P8, 68:68).
Agribank takes time. If ever you do not have savings of your own you will find yourself just 
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waiting for Agribank because Agribank takes forever for what reason I don’t know. Maybe it’s 
because all the farmers in Namibia depend on Agribank or they are waiting for people to pay 
back their money. I don’t know but Agribank really takes long to respond or give assistance 
way later than they had promised you at first. Sometimes the good season to plant just pass you 
by doing nothing because you do not have money just waiting for Agribank although you had 
repaid your money on time (P13, 99:99).
It is too tedious. I mean you gotta know how tall your mother was, what size of shoes she is 
wearing, I hate those things. I think filling in forms is one thing I hate with a passion you know 
in the end it is as if you have undressed yourself and in the end you are told that no your shape 
is not good enough to get the loan. I mean that’s how I feel about applying for loans though we 
can’t do without but that’s my personal feeling. It’s an impossibility you know so the require-
ments, the loan requirements are too stiff, they are impractical and they are not workable (P4, 
98:129). 
These issues demonstrate the bureaucratic process that farmers have to go 
through before gaining access to finance.  
5.8 Financing constraints – supply side 
Supply-side constraints in this paper refer to difficulties experienced by lend-
ers, namely Agribank, in providing finance to borrowers, namely small- and 
medium-scale farmers.
The issue of lack of collateral makes up the major constraint among the inter-
views conducted at Agribank see Figure 5. 
fiGurE 5: Supply-SidE financinG conSTrainTS
Source: authors’ data, fieldwork, 2014
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5.9 Lack of collateral
The types of properties that are needed by the bank to serve as collateral or 
security are not the ones owned by many farmers who need loans. The 
following quotes illustrate this fact: 
As people don’t have collateral which is part of the requirements that we need that becomes 
a bit difficult for us to grant loans. We have got a branch in Katima its very, it’s not performing 
very well in a sense that you only have a handful of teachers, handful of nurses and a handful of 
policemen that can own a property in town because most of them might be staying in villages 
which of they can’t use that property as collateral so to grant loans becomes a bit difficult in that 
area but it’s very, it’s one of the very fertile areas in the country but it needs a boost in terms of 
agricultural sector (P17, 82:82).
5.10. Moral hazard
Lenders are reluctant to provide finance because loans are used for purposes 
other than agriculture and farmers do not understand the implications of asking 
for a loan.
We have got the livestock loan product which I feel is being misused, is being misused by the 
public because the funds are never used for the intended purpose (P17, 100:100).
5.11 Poor recovery of loans
In addition to moral hazard, when Agribank decides to grant loans, it runs the 
risk of loan default among borrowers. This is because the government provides 
collateral on their behalf and farmers feel that if they default on their loans, they 
have nothing to lose. 
For those who are having security they really try their effort to repay because they know that 
there is something at stake. If they don’t pay, the bank might realise that security and they will 
lose out but for those who are not providing the own security they are bit reluctant to pay, they 
know that they don’t have anything to lose (P18, 53:53).
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6. Discussion and summary
The aim of the study was to identify and explain the financing constraints for 
agricultural SMEs. The results in this paper have confirmed that (as illustrated 
in figures 6 and 7) many of the constraints presented in the results section occur 
as a result of other constraints. Finance is indeed a binding constraint. 
fiGurE 6: nETwork viEw of ThE dEmand conSTrainTS
Source: authors’ construct from own data
fiGurE 7: nETwork viEw of ThE Supply conSTrainTS
Source: authors’ construct from own data
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Finance is a binding constraint because many of the bank’s rules and regulations 
have an adverse effect on farmers’ ability to gain access to credit because of lack 
of collateral, bureaucratic issues, lending criteria used and short timeframe for 
land lease, thus affecting production. This essay largely confirms the research 
discussed in the literature showing market imperfections to include lack of 
information (Bartlett & Bukvič, 2001), bank paperwork and bureaucracy (Beck, 
2013), lack of collateral (Foltz, 2004) and moral hazard problems (Holmstrom, 
1979). The deliberately extended quotations from interviews in the results section 
provide an indication of the realities/constraints of farming. Lack of collateral 
is identified as the biggest constraint among independent farmers, but this is not 
surprising because government only provides collateral for small-scale farmers 
in Green Scheme projects. However, this still creates some uncertainty among 
the farmers who receive collateral from Agribank because of a lack of security 
of tenure: “The land belongs to the government and not to us and because of 
this you can find me here today but tomorrow I might not be here.” What is 
surprising is that farmers in Green Scheme projects but without Agribank loans 
own medium-scale farms (mainly from the Hardap Region) compared to small-
scale farms owned by Agribank loan holders, which could be an indication of 
market inefficiencies. 
There are several issues that may need special attention on the supply side. 
These are the fact that there are some independent farmers who have already 
commenced with their businesses and may not really need to form part of the 
Green Scheme projects in order to obtain finance from a bank. Such farmers 
have already shown the capability to produce, and thus other factors could 
be considered to serve as collateral apart from land. Not all farmers outside 
Green Scheme projects are the same; therefore, the merit of each case should be 
considered. Taking into account the fact that medium-scale farmers own bigger 
plots than small-scale farmers, Carter (1988) has noted that banks discriminate 
against small-scale farmers when farm size is used as an indicator of individual 
characteristics. Although credit is a determining factor in profits and investment, 
market failures such as labour, land and transportation issues overwhelm the 
effect of credit (Foltz, 2004). 
Poor timely response to farmers has been shown to have an undesirable effect 
on enhancing production, therefore causing low profits. It is in this context 
that the World Bank argues that “Small and Medium farmers not only need 
access to finance for investment, they also need it in a timely fashion to take 
advantage of market and investment opportunities” (World Bank, 2008a:18). 
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Lack of water also prevents farmers from gaining access to markets because, for 
example, with no access to water, efficient production becomes a difficult task. 
This affects one’s ability to pay back a loan or discourages one from looking 
for a loan, thus resulting in accumulation of loan defaults. The argument by 
Agbozo and Yeboah (2012) that market imperfections result in misallocation of 
capital, lower productivity and poverty traps has proven to be true in this case, 
especially when it comes to poverty traps. Safeguarding basic needs such as 
water is absolutely essential for poverty reduction. 
If the aim of the Green Scheme of increasing food production through irrigation 
production is to remain, there are important aspects such as imports that should 
be taken into account in order to create markets. Furthermore, the absence of 
loan officers in the field as demand-side constraints came across as an issue 
of ignorance, for example, “They don’t understand our situation as us farmers 
who are down here because for them they are just in the office”, while that 
of loan default as a supply-side constraint among Agribank loan holders came 
across as an issue of attitude, for example, “For those who are not providing 
their own security they are bit reluctant to pay, they know that they don’t have 
anything to lose”. The results of the study are extremely important for the long-
term survival of not only the Green Scheme projects but also the prosperity of 
independent farmers in their businesses, assuming that the constraints identified 
in this paper are addressed.
Farming is naturally an activity extremely dependent on the climate and 
vulnerable to the pest challenges peculiar to a particular year, and as a result, 
farmers face the difficulty of actually developing their farms from small- to 
medium-scale businesses, as evidenced in this paper. “It is difficult for farmers 
like us who are going to graduate to go to the medium farmer.” In addition, 
rural credit is complicated by the seasonal nature of agricultural production, 
weather- and price-related risks, and the dispersed nature of farming, and 
this makes farming a unique activity. With this view, it is critical for formal 
financial institutions to increase their understanding of small-scale agriculture 
(De Klerk et al., 2013). A respondent said, for example, “They don’t understand 
the situation which is on the ground in the farm.” Namibia’s NDP4 documents 
(as part of Vision 2030) talk about continued financial and technical support 
between 2012 and 2017 to those involved in agricultural production activities 
(NPC, 2013). This can only be achieved if the problems that farmers face are 
dealt with and if farmers abide by the rules. Of course, financial constraints 
cannot all be eliminated at once, but coordination, realistic rules and regulations, 
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collaboration, innovative approaches and acting in an organised manner are a 
way to start and are advisable to both the demand and the supply side. The 
findings of this study were based on a small sample and therefore may not be 
generalisable. Nevertheless, within the context of qualitative studies, the findings 
point to the need to take the problems experienced by small- and medium-scale 
businesses, including farmers, in rural Namibia more seriously. 
Thus, without going against the idea of promoting smallholder farming, Collier 
and Dercon (2014) are indeed correct to argue that fixing market imperfections 
such as timely response, agricultural infrastructure, access to markets and access 
to land that can be used as collateral, among other constraints identified in this 
paper, may be the best solution. The paper shows that market imperfections are 
more systemic than acknowledged in mainstream economic theorising. From 
a policy perspective, this finding suggests that SMEs require financial state 
support. Precisely how to do so, especially how to link this support with social 
perfection, requires more research. 
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